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Abstract—We consider the sequential anomaly detection prob-
lem in the one-class setting when only the anomalous sequences
are available. We propose an adversarial sequential detector by
solving a minimax problem, optimizing the detection performance
for the worst-case sequences that mimic the anomalous sequences
statistically, and specifically capture the dependence in a sequence
of events using the marked point process model. When apply-
ing the detector sequentially, we evaluate the likelihood of a
given sequence recursively and compare it with a time-varying
threshold, which is also learned from data through the minimax
problem. Using numerical experiments on simulations and real-
world datasets, we demonstrate the superior performance of our
proposed method.
Index Terms—sequential anomaly detection, adversarial learn-
ing, imitation learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, spatio-temporal event data are ubiquitous in
our daily lives, ranging from electronic transaction records,
earthquake activities recorded by seismic sensors, and police
reports. Such data consist of a sequence of discrete events
that indicate when and where each event occurred as well as
other additional descriptions such as its category or volume. In
many scenarios, when an anomalous incident occurs, it may
be followed by a series of anomalous events related to the
incident. Detecting such a chain of anomalous events in an
online fashion as quickly as possible is vital to prevent further
economic loss for societal benefits.
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Fig. 1: An example of a sequence of anomalous events that
are dependent: one leads to another.
Consider a motivating example of detecting credit card
fraudulence at Macy’s, the department store. As demonstrated
in Fig. 1, the events in this setting correspond to a sequence
of unauthorized transactions. Each transaction record typically
includes information on time, location, and transaction amount
of the purchase. For instance, Fig. 2a shows an example of an
anomalous sequence. A fraudster used a stolen card for twelve
times in just six days. These transactions were made at stores
(a) transactions by one card (b) transactions overview
Fig. 2: A real example of sequential anomalies in fraud
credit card transactions provided by Macy’s the department
store: (a) shows a sequence of transactions made by one
stolen credit card. Each bar represents a fraudulent purchase,
where the height of the bar indicates its transaction amount
in dollars, and the color of the bar indicates the location
where the purchase was made; (b) gives an overview of how
these fraudulent transactions were distributed over stores and
seasons.
far away from each other, ranging from California to New
England, and the type of transactions may be quite different
from the normal spending pattern of the card. Fig. 2b illustrates
a collection of larger number of fraudulent transactions. It is
observed that a significant portion of transactions occurred
solely at Macy’s Herald Square and Macy’s Union Square, two
largest department stores in the United States. To stop frauds
and prevent further losses for both consumers and retailers,
identifying whether a sequence is an anomaly as early as
possible has become an urgent need for the merchants. To
protect consumer privacy, Macy’s can not provide normal
transaction data from customers, which creates a situation
where only anomalous transaction data are available for devel-
oping algorithms. Such “one-class” problem makes the task of
building fraud detector even more challenging.
There has been much research effort in machine learn-
ing and statistics for sequential anomaly detection [1]–[4].
However, most of the existing methods cannot be directly
applied here for the following reasons. (1) Many existing
works consider detecting anomalous sequences “as a whole”
rather than detect in an online fashion, and decisions can not
be made until the sequence has been fully observed. (2) The
one-class data situation requires an unsupervised approach
for anomaly detection. However, most sequential anomaly
detection algorithms are based on supervised learning.
In this paper, we present an adversarial anomaly detec-
tion algorithm for one-class sequential detection, where only
anomalous data are available. On a high-level, our adversarial
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2anomaly detector is formulated as a minimax problem: where
the detector is optimized to detect the “worst-case” counterfeit
sequence from a generator that maximally mimics the pro-
vided anomalous sequence data. The minimax formulation is
inspired by imitation learning [5] can be explained as mini-
mizing the maximum mean discrepancy [6] (MMD). A notable
feature of our algorithm is that our detector uses a time-
varying threshold that is learned from data (also solved from
the minimax problem), which provides a “tightest” control
of the false-alarms. Such a time-varying threshold is hard
to obtain precisely in theory. Here, we provide a data-driven
computational approach crucial to achieving good performance
as validated by numerical examples using simulation and real-
data. The time-varying threshold learned sequentially from
data is a drastic departure from prior approaches in sequential
anomaly detection. In particular, we parametrize the detector
as the likelihood function of marked Hawkes processes, and
present a novel deep Fourier kernel in the model. The resulted
likelihood function (using deep Fourier kernel) is computa-
tionally efficient to carry out the online detection, and at the
same time, allows the capture of complex dependence between
events in anomalous sequences. The adversarial generator is
built upon the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [7]; the
output of our LSTM specifies the distribution rather than the
exact occurrence (time and location) of the next event. We
demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed method
on synthetic and real data for sequential anomaly detection by
comparing state-of-the-art methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first discuss
the related work in sequential anomaly detection and revisit
some basic definitions in imitation learning. Section II sets up
the problem and introduces our sequential anomaly detection
framework. Section III proposes a new marked point process
model equipped with deep Fourier kernel to model dependent
sequential data. Section IV presents the adversarial sequence
generator and learning algorithms. Finally, we present our
numerical results on both real and synthetic data in Section V.
A. Related work
There are several branches of related research to this work,
including imitation learning via inverse reinforcement learning
for the unknown reward/utility function, the long-term-short-
term (LSTM) architecture for modeling sequence data, and
one-class anomaly detection, which we review below.
Much work has been done on imitation learning, also known
as the apprenticeship learning. [8] examines apprenticeship
learning by inverse reinforcement learning to uncover un-
known reward functions in Markov decision processes. Their
model proposes the true reward function is a linear combina-
tion of known features, and the goal of learning is to find an
adequate approximation of the reward. The work by [9] looks
into apprenticeship learning under a similar framework as well;
however, with a different modeling structure. In their work,
the learning process is achieved by devising a game playing
procedure involving two opponents in a zero-sum game. This
alteration not only allows them to achieve the same goal of
doing nearly as well as the expert as in [8], but also with
the potential to substantially outperform. This game procedure
guides the authors to propose an algorithm using multiplicative
weights for apprenticeship learning. The scenario of lacking
the expert is also accommodated.
Apart from the learning structure of the unknown reward
function, there are numerous published papers in the area of
anomaly detection, which are relevant to this work. Principle
Component Analysis (PCA) has traditionally be used to aid
detecting outliers, which naturally fits into anomaly detection.
In [10] the authors propose a robust auto-encoder model,
which is closely related to PCA for anomaly detection. A
deep neural network is introduced for the training process.
Additionally, the authors of [11] proposed a one-class neural
network to detect anomalies in complex data sets by creating
a tight envelope around normal data. It is improved from
the one-class singular value decomposition formulation to be
more robust. A closely related work from [12] also looks
into one-class anomaly detection by proposing a deep support
vector data description model, which finds a data-enclosing
hyper-sphere with minimum volume. Both aforementioned
papers look into one-class anomaly detection for independent
and identically distributed samples, which differs from the
sequential setting.
There are several works on reinforcement learning related
to our work. In [13], the emphasis is put onto the value
distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement
learning agent. A new algorithm applying Bellman’s equation
to learning approximate value distribution is proposed, aiding
deeper understanding of value distribution in the learning
process. The work in [14] proposed a probabilistic approach
to the imitation learning problem involving the recovery of
the unknown utility function. Inverse reinforcement learning is
applied in this work as well, which is formulated via maximum
entropy. The work proposed an efficient state frequency algo-
rithm which is composed of both backward and forward passes
recursively. This is related to the idea of the Kalman filter in
signal estimation. A more recent similar article by [15] seeks
to integrate the inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) with
anomaly detection. The authors devise the IRL to determine
the underlying triggering function, which is the reward. The
major difference, however, is the reward learned is for the
normal pattern. A Bayesian method is further used for anomaly
detection.
Finally, there are works perform sequential anomaly detec-
tion problem using LSTM, which is similar to the proposed
stochastic LSTM used as the adversarial generator in our work.
In [16], the authors proposed an encoder-decoder scheme
using LSTM to learn the normal behavior of data and used
reconstruction errors to find anomalies. The work of [17]
built a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) model with LSTM
structure to conduct anomaly detection for multivariate time
series data for flight operations. Another paper from [18]
looks into anomaly detection in videos by convolutional neural
networks with the LSTM modeling. It is clear from the
publications that the LSTM model is versatile for various
applications and can be used for modeling unknown complex
sequential data. The major difference between the proposed
stochastic LSTM and its counterparts is on the randomness.
Here it is introduced to enable LSTM to capture the stochastic
3nature of sequential data and produce more realistic counterfeit
sequences in real applications.
This paper is a significant extension of our previous con-
ference paper [19], which studies the one-class sequential
anomaly detection using a framework of Generative Adver-
sarial Network (GAN) [20], [21] based on the cross-entropy
between the real and generated distributions. In this paper,
we focus on a different loss function motivated by imitation
learning and MMD distances, which is more computationally
efficient. Moreover, we present the time-varying threshold for
the first time.
B. Background: Inverse reinforcement learning
Since imitation learning is a form of reinforcement learning
(RL), in the following, we will provide some necessary
background about RL. Consider an agent interacting with
the environment. At each step, the agent selects an action
based on its current state, to which the environment responds
with a reward value and the next state. The return is the
sum of (discounted) rewards through the agents trajectory of
interactions with the environment. The value function of a
policy describes the expected return from taking action from
a state. The inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to find
a reward function from the expert demonstrations that could
explain the expert behavior. Seminal works [8], [22] provide
a max-min formulation to address the problem. The authors
propose a strategy to match the value function between an
observed expert policy and a learners behavior. Let pi denote
the expert policy and piϕ denote the learner policy, respectively.
The optimal reward function r can be found as the saddle-point
of the following max-min problem [9], i.e.,
max
r∈F
min
ϕ∈G
{
Ex∼pi
[
Nx∑
i=1
r(xi, si)
]
− Ez∼piϕ
[
Nz∑
i=1
r(zi, si)
]}
,
where F is the family class for reward function and G is the
family class for learner policy. Here, x = {x1, . . . , xNx} is
a sequence of actions generated by the expert policy pi, z =
{z1, . . . , zNz} is a roll-out sequence generated from the learner
policy piϕ, and Nx and Nz are the numbers of actions for
sequences x and z, respectively. The formulation means that a
proper reward function should provide the expert policy higher
reward than any other learner policy in G, and the learner
can also approach the expert performance by maximizing this
reward.
II. ADVERSARIAL SEQUENTIAL ANOMALY DETECTION
We focus on a setting where only anomalous sequences
are available. We aim to develop a detector that can detect
the anomalous sequence in an online fashion and detect the
anomaly as soon as possible. Denote such a detector as `
with parameter θ. At each time t, the detector evaluates a
statistic and compares it with a threshold. For a length-N
sequence x1:i := [x1, . . . , xi]>, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , the detector
is a stopping rule: it stops and raises an alarm the first time
that the detection statistic exceeds the threshold:
T = inf{t : `(x1:i; θ) > ηi, ti ≤ t < ti+1}, i = 1, . . . , N.
(1)
Once an alarm is raised, the sequence is flagged as an anomaly.
If there is no alarm raised till the end of the time horizon, the
sequence is considered normal.
A. Proposed: Adversarial anomaly detection
Now we describe our adversarial anomaly detector. As-
sume a set of anomalous sequences drawn from an empirical
distribution pi. Since normal sequences are not available, we
introduce an adversarial generator, which produces “normal”
sequences that are statistically similar to the real anomalous
sequences. The detector has to discriminate the true anoma-
lous sequence from the counterfeit “normal” sequences. We
introduce competition between the anomaly detector, and the
generator drives both models to improve their performances
until anomalies can be distinguishable from the worst-case
counterfeits. This approach can also be viewed as finding the
“worst-case” distribution that defines the “border region” for
detection. Formally, we formulate this as a minimax problem
as follows:
min
ϕ∈G
max
θ∈Θ
J(θ, ϕ) := Ex∼pi `(x; θ)− Ez∼Gz(ϕ) `(z; θ), (2)
where Gz is an adversarial generator specified by parameter
ϕ ∈ G and G is a family of candidate generators. Here
the detection statistic corresponds to `(θ), the log-likelihood
function of the sequence specified by θ ∈ Θ and Θ is its
parameter space. The choices of the adversarial generator
and the detector will be further discussed in Section III. The
detector compares the detection statistic to a threshold. We
define the following:
Definition 1 (Adversarial sequential anomaly detector). De-
note the solution to the minimax problem (2) as (θ∗, ϕ∗). A
sequential adversarial detector raises an alarm at the time i
if
`(x1:i; θ
∗) > η∗i , (3)
where the time-varying threshold η∗i ∝ Ez∼Gz(ϕ∗) `(z1:i; θ∗).
B. Time-varying threshold
Now we explain the choice of the time-varying threshold
η∗i ∝ Ez∼Gz(ϕ∗) `(z1:i; θ∗). Since the value of log-likelihood
function `(x1:i; θ∗) for partial sequence observation x1:i may
vary over the time step i (the i-the event is occurred), we
need to adjust the threshold accordingly for making decisions
as a function of i. Note that our time-varying threshold η∗i is
drastically different from statistical sequential analysis, where
the threshold for performing detection is usually constant or
pre-set (not adaptive to data) based on the known distributions
of the data sequence (e.g., set the threshold growing over time
as
√
t [23]). The rationale behind the design of the threshold
η∗i is that, at any given time step, the log-likelihood of the
data sequence is larger than that of the generated adversarial
sequence; therefore, η∗i provides the tight lower bound for
the likelihood of anomalous sequences `(x; θ∗) due to the
minimization in (2). That is, for any ϕ ∈ G,
0 ≤ Ex∼pi `(x1:i; θ∗)− η∗i
≤ Ex∼pi `(x1:i; θ∗)− Ez∼Gz(ϕ) `(z1:i; θ∗).
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Fig. 3: A illustration of the adversarial anomaly detection and
threshold using synthetic data with 1000 sequences. The red
and grey dash lines represent mean detection statistics (`(θ∗))
for anomalous and counterfeit normal sequences, respectively.
The blue dash line corresponds to the time-varying threshold;
clearly, the threshold can separate the anomalous sequences
from the random sequences.
The adversarial sequences drawn from Gz(ϕ∗) can be viewed
as the normal sequences that are statistically “closest” to
anomalous sequences. Therefore, the log-likelihood of such
sequences in the “worst-case” scenario defines the “border
region” for detection. In practice, the threshold η∗i can be
estimated by 1/n′
∑n′
l=1 `(z
l
1:i; θ
∗), where {zl}l=1,...,n′ are
adversarial sequences sampled from Gz(ϕ) and n′ is the
number of the sequences. As a real example presented in
Fig. 3, the time-varying threshold in blue line can sharply
separate the anomalous sequences from the normal sequences.
More experimental results are presented in Section V.
C. Connection to imitation learning
Our framework can also be viewed as an instance of
imitation learning [8]. The problem formulation (2) resembles
the minimax formulation in inverse reinforcement learning
(IRL) proposed by seminal works [8], [22]. As shown in Fig. 4,
an observed anomalous samples x ∼ pi can be regarded as an
expert demonstration sampled from the expert policy pi, where
each x = {x1, . . . , xN} is a sequence of events with length
of N and the sequences may be of different lengths. Each
event xi, i = 1, . . . , N of the sequence is analogous to the
i-th action made by the expert given the history of past events
{x1, x2, . . . , xi−1} as the corresponding state. Accordingly,
the generator can be regarded as a learner that generates
convincing counterfeit trajectories.
The log-likelihood of observed sequences can be interpreted
as undiscounted return, i.e., the accumulated sum of rewards
evaluated at past actions. The ultimate goal of the proposed
framework (2) is to close the gap between the return of the
expert demonstrations and the return of the learner trajectories
so that the counterfeit trajectories can meet the lower bound
of the real demonstrations.
D. Connection to MMD-like distance
The proposed approach can also be viewed as minimizing a
maximum mean discrepancy (MMD)-like distance metric [6]
as illustrated in Fig. 5. More specifically, the maximization in
(2) is analogous to an MMD metric in a reduced function class
Anomaly expert 𝜋 𝒙 ∼ 𝜋
𝒛 ∼ 𝐺(𝜑) Minimizediscrepancy
𝔼𝒙∼# ℓ 𝒙; 𝜃 Reward function 𝜃(Discriminator)
𝔼𝒛∼%!(') ℓ(𝒛; 𝜃) Adversarial learner 𝜑Adversarial learner 𝜑
Update 𝜑
Maximize
discrepancy
Update 𝜃
Fig. 4: An illustration of the imitation learning interpretation.
specified by Θ, i.e., supθ∈Θ Ex∼pi `(x; θ) − Ez∼g `(z; θ),
where Θ may not necessarily be a space of continuous,
bounded functions on sample space. As shown in [6], if Θ is
sufficiently expressive (universal), e.g., the function class on
reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS), then maximization
over such Θ is equivalent to the original definition. Based on
this, we select a function class that serves our purpose for
anomaly detection (characterizing the log-likelihood function
of the sequence), which has enough expressive power for
our purposes. Therefore, the problem defined in (2) can be
regarded as minimizing such an MMD-like metric between
the empirical distribution of anomalous sequences and the
distribution of adversarial sequences. The minimal MMD
distance corresponds to the best “detection radius” that we
can find without observing normal sequences.
𝒢𝜋Empiricaldistribution
𝜑𝜑∗MMD[Θ, 𝜋, 𝜑]
Adversarial sequenceAnomalous sequence
Fig. 5: The empirical distribution of anomalous sequences is
pi. The assumed family of candidate generators is G. Our
proposed framework aims to minimize the maximum mean
discrepancy (MMD) in a reduced function class Θ between pi
and ϕ ∈ G.
III. POINT PROCESS WITH DEEP FOURIER KERNELS
Now we present a model for the discrete events, which will
lead to the detection statistic (i.e., the form of the likelihood
function `(x; θ)). We present a marked Hawkes process model
that can capture the fact that the events consist of time,
location, and marks correlated. We further consider the Fourier
kernel for Hawkes process (c.f. Section 6.6 [24] for discussion
of Fourier kernel) to capture the joint correlation between
marks. The Fourier kernel also enables efficient computation
of the likelihood function by leading to a closed-form expres-
sion of an integral in the likelihood function – a notorious
difficulty in evaluating the likelihood function for Hawkes
processes.
Assume each observation is a marked spatio-temporal tuple
which consists of time, location, and marks: xi = (ti,mi),
5where ti ∈ [0, T ) is the time of occurrence of the ith event,
and mi ∈ M ⊆ Rd is the d-dimensional mark (here we treat
location as one of a mark). The time information is important
because it defines the order that the event occurs and the time
interval, which carries a lot of information.
A. Preliminary: Marked temporal point processes
The marked temporal point processes (MTPPs) [25], [26]
offer a versatile mathematical framework for modeling se-
quential data consisting of an ordered sequence of discrete
events localized in time, and mark spaces (space or other
additional information), and have proven useful in a wide
range of applications [27]–[31]. Recent works [19], [32]–[37]
have achieved many successes in modeling temporal event
data (some with marks) correlated in the time domain using
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs).
Let {x1, x2, . . . , xNT } represent a sequence of observations.
Denote NT as the number of the points generated in the
time horizon [0, T ). The events’ distributions in MTPPs are
characterized via a conditional intensity function λ(t,m|Ht),
which is the probability of observing an event in the marked
temporal space [0, T ) ×M given the events’ history Ht =
{(ti,mi)|ti < t}, i.e.,
λ(t,m|Ht) = E [N([t, t+ dt)×B(m, dm))|Ht]
dt× |B(m, dm)| ,
where N(A) is the counting measure of events over the set
A ⊆ [0, T )×M and |B(m, dm)| is the Lebesgue measure of
the ball B(m, dm) with radius dm. Assuming that influence
from past events are linearly additive for the current event, the
conditional intensity function of a Hawkes process is defined
as
λ(t,m|Ht) = µ+
∑
ti<t
g(t− ti,m−mi), (4)
where µ ≥ 0 is the background intensity of events, g(·) ≥ 0
is the triggering function that captures spatio-temporal and
marked dependencies of the past events. The triggering func-
tion can be chosen in advance, e.g., in one-dimensional cases,
g(t, ti) = α exp{−β(t− ti)}.
The conditional probability density function of a point
process is defined as
f(t,m|Ht) = λ(t,m|Ht)
exp
{
−
∫ t
tn
∫
M
λ(t′,m′|Ht′)dm′dt′
}
.
See Appendix A for the derivation for the form of the con-
ditional intensity. The log-likelihood of observing a sequence
with n events denoted as x = {(ti,mi)}NTi=1 can be obtained
by:
`(x; θ) =
NT∑
i=1
log λ(ti,mi|Hti)−
∫ T
0
∫
M
λ(t,m|Ht)dmdt.
(5)
See Appendix B for derivation of the log-likelihood function.
B. Hawkes processes with deep Fourier kernel
One major computational challenge in evaluating the log-
likelihood function is the computation of the integral in (5),
which is multi-dimensional and performed in the possibly
continuous mark and time-space. It can be intractable for a
general model without a carefully crafted structure.
To address this challenge, we adopt an approach to represent
the triggering function of Hawkes process via a Fourier kernel.
The spectrum for the Fourier features is parametrized by
a deep neural network, as shown in Fig. 6. For notational
simplicity, denote x := (t,m) ∈ X as the most recent event
and x′ := (t′,m′) ∈ X , t′ < t as an occurred event in the
past, where X := [0, T ] ×M ⊂ Rd+1 is the space for time
and mark. Define the conditional intensity function as
λ(x|Ht; θ) = µ+ α
∑
t′<t
K(x, x′), (6)
where α represents the magnitude of the influence from the
past, µ ≥ 0 is the background intensity of events. The kernel
function K(x, x′) measures the influence of the past event
on the current event x, x′ ∈ X , and we will parameterize its
kernel-induced feature mapping using a deep neural network
θ ∈ Θ.
𝑥 − 𝑥′ 𝜔
𝑝!𝐾(𝑥, 𝑥")
𝑥
𝑥′
𝑡
triggering
Fourier
feature
Inverse Fourier transform
events
random
noise
𝜔 ∼ 𝑝! 𝜁 ∼ 𝑝#DNN
density
Fig. 6: An illustration for the Fourier kernel function K(x, x′)
and its Fourier representation; the spectrum of Fourier features
are represented by a deep neural network.
The formulation of deep Fourier kernel function relies
on Bochners Theorem [38], which states that any bounded,
continuous, and shift-invariant kernel is a Fourier transform
of a bounded non-negative measure:
Theorem 1 (Bochner [38]). A continuous kernel of the form
K(x, x′) = g(x−x′) defined over a locally compact set X ⊂
Rd is positive definite if and only if g is the Fourier transform
of a non-negative measure:
K(x, x′) = g(x− x′) =
∫
Ω
pω(ω)e
iw>(x−x′)dω, (7)
where i =
√−1, pω is a non-negative measure, Ω is the
Fourier feature space, and kernels of the form ν(x, x′) are
called shift-invariant kernel.
If a shift-invariant kernel in (7) is positive semi-definite
and scaled such that g(0) = 1, Bochners theorem ensures
that its Fourier transform pω can be viewed as a probability
distribution function since it normalize to 1 and is non-
negative. In this sense, the spectrum pω can be viewed as
the distribution of r-dimensional Fourier features indexed by
ω ∈ Ω ⊂ Rr. Hence, we may obtain a triggering function in
6x° x0
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t
∏
Noise prior Optimal spectrum Triggering function Intensity function
𝑝!𝑝"
DNN IFT Hawkes
Fig. 7: An instance of calculating the conditional intensity λ through performing inverse Fourier transform: (1) generate random
noise; (2) map the noises to the frequencies according to the optimal spectrum; (3) perform inverse Fourier transform (IFT) in
the frequency domain and obtain the triggering function; (4) calculate the intensity function based on the triggering function.
(6) between two events x, x′ ∈ X ⊂ Rd+1 which satisfies the
“kernel embedding”:
Proposition 1. Let the triggering function K be a continuous
real-valued shift-invariant kernel and pω a probability distri-
bution function. Then
K(x, x′) := Eω∼pω
[
φω(x) · φω(x′)
]
, (8)
where φω(x) :=
√
2 cos(ω>Wx + u) and W ∈ Rr×(d+1)
is a weight matrix These Fourier features ω ∈ Ω ⊂ Rr are
sampled from pω and u is drawn uniformly from [0, 2pi].
The proof is given in Appendix C.
In practice, the expression (8) can be approximated empir-
ically, i.e.,
K˜(x, x′) =
1
D
D∑
k=1
φωk(x) · φωk(x′) = Φ(x)>Φ(x′), (9)
where ωk, k = 1, . . . , D are D Fourier features sam-
pled from the distribution pω . The vector Φ(x) :=
[φω1(x), . . . , φωD (x)]
> can be viewed as the approximation
of the kernel-induced feature mapping for the score. In the
experiments, we substitute exp{iw>(x − x′)} with a real-
valued feature mapping, such that the probability distribution
pω and the kernel ν are real [39].
The next proposition shows the empirical estimation (9)
converges to the population value uniformly over all points
in a compact domain X as the sample size D grows. It is a
lower variance approximation to (8).
Proposition 2. Assume σ2p = Eω∼pω [ω>ω] < ∞ and a
compact set X ⊂ Rd+1. Let R denote the radius of the
Euclidean ball containing X . Then for the kernel-induced
feature mapping Φ defined in (9), we have
P
{
sup
x,x′∈X
∣∣Φ(x)>Φ(x′)−K(x, x′)∣∣ ≥ }
≤
(
48Rσp

)2
exp
{
− D
2
4(d+ 3)
}
.
(10)
The proof is given in Appendix D. The proposition ensures
that kernel function can be consistently estimated using a finite
number of Fourier features. In particular, note that for an error
bound , the number of samples needed is on the order of
D = O((d+ 1) log(Rσp/)/
2), which grows linearly as data
dimension d increases, implying the sample complexity is mild
in the high-dimensional setting.
a) Fourier feature generator.: To represent the distribu-
tion pω , we assume it is a transformation of random noise
ζ ∼ pζ through a non-linear mapping ψ0 : Rq → Rr, as shown
in Fig. 6, where ψ0 is a differentiable and it is represented by
a deep neural network and q is the dimension of the noise.
Roughly speaking, pω is the probability density function of
ψ0(ζ), ζ ∼ pζ . Note that the triggering kernel is jointly
controlled by the deep network parameters and the weight
matrix W ; we denote all of these parameters as θ ∈ Θ.
Fig. 7 gives an illustrative example of representing the
conditional intensity given sequence history using our ap-
proach. We choose q = r = 2 to visualize the noise prior
pζ and the optimal spectra p∗ω in a two-dimensional space.
The optimal spectrum learned from data uniquely specifies
a kernel function capable of capturing various types of non-
linear triggering effects. Unlike Hawkes processes, underlying
long-term influences of some events, in this case, can be
preserved in the intensity function.
C. Efficient computation of log-likelihood function
As discussed in Section III-B, the technical difficulty of
evaluating the log-likelihood function is to perform the multi-
dimensional integral of the kernel function. In particular,
given a sequence of events x, the log-likelihood function
of our model can be written by substituting the conditional
intensity function in (5) with (6), and thus we need to evaluate∫
X λ(x|Ht; θ)dx. In many existing works, this term is carried
out by some numerical integration techniques. Here we present
a way to simplify the computation by deriving closed-form
expression for the integral as the following proposition, as a
benefit given by the Fourier kernel, and thus avoid numerical
integral.
Proposition 3 (Integral of conditional intensity function). Let
tNT+1 = T and t0 = 0. Given ordered events {x1, . . . , xNT }
in the time horizon [0, T ]. The integral term in the log-
likelihood function can be written as
∫
X
λ(x|Ht; θ)dx = µT (b− a)d + 1
D
D∑
k=1
NT∑
i=0
∑
tj<ti
cos
(−ω>k Wxj) cos( ti+1 + ti2
)
sin
(
ti+1 − ti
2
)
cosd
(
b+ a
2
)
sind
(
b− a
2
) d+1∏
`=1
2eω
>
k w`
ω>k w`
,
(11)
7where w`, ` = 1, . . . , d is the `-th column vector in the matrix
W , and [a, b] are the range for each dimension of the mark
space M.
The proof in given in Appendix E.
Remark 1. From the right-hand side of (11), clearly, the sec-
ond term only depends on the weight matrix W , D randomly
sampled Fourier features, the time of events occurred before
t, and the region of the marked space. If we re-scale the range
of each coordinate of the mark to be [0, 2pi], i.e., b = 2pi and
a = 0, then the second term of the integral equals to 0 and
the integral defined in (11) can be further simplified as∫
X
λ(x|Ht; θ)dx = µT (2pi)d.
In particular, when d = 1, the integral becomes:∫
X
λ(x|Ht; θ)dx = µT + 1
D
D∑
k=1
NT∑
i=0
∑
tj<ti
cos
(−ω>k Wxj) cos( ti+1 + ti2
)
sin
(
ti+1 − ti
2
)
2eω
>
k W
ω>k W
.
D. Recursive computation of log-likelihood function
Note that, leveraging the conditional probability decomposi-
tion, we can compute of the log-likelihood function `(x1:i; θ∗)
recursively:
`(x1:1; θ
∗) = log f(x1|Ht1);
`(x1:i; θ
∗) = `(x1:i−1; θ∗) + log f(xi|Hti ; θ∗), ∀i > 1,
(12)
where
f(xi|Hti ; θ) = λ(xi|Hti ; θ)e−µ(ti−ti−1)(2pi)
d
.
This recursive expression makes it convenient to evaluate the
detection statistic sequentially and perform online detection,
which we summarize in Algorithm 1.
IV. ADVERSARIAL SEQUENCE GENERATOR
Now we describe the parameterization for the adversarial
sequence generator. To achieve rich reprensetation power for
the adversarial generator Gz , we borrow the idea of popular
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) structure.
In particular, we develop an RNN-type generator with
stochastic neurons [3], [34] as shown in Fig. 8, which can
represent the nonlinear and long-range sequential dependency
𝒉!"# 𝒉! 𝒉!$#
𝑧! 𝑧!$# 𝑧!$%𝑡! 𝑡!$# 𝑡!$%
deterministic forward
stochastic forward
timeline
events
states
Fig. 8: RNN-based adversarial sequence generator.
Algorithm 1: Online detection algorithm
Input: An unknown sequence x with NT events and
optimal model parameters θ∗, ϕ∗;
while i ≤ NT do
Generate D Fourier features from Gζ(ζ; θ∗) denoted
as Ω̂ = {ωk}k=1,...,D;
Compute the log-likelihood `(x1:i; θ∗) given Ω̂
according to (12);
Generate n′ adversarial sequences from Gz(z;ϕ∗)
denoted as Ẑ = {zl}l=1,...,n′ ;
η∗i ← 1/n′
∑n′
l=1 `(z
l
1:i; θ
∗);
if `(x1:i; θ) ≥ η∗i then
Declare that it is an anomaly and record the
stopping time ti;
end
i← i+ 1;
end
Declare that it is not an anomaly;
structure. Denote the i-th generated adversarial event as zi :=
(ti−1 +∆ti,mi), where ∆ti is the time interval between event
zi−1, zi. The generating process is described below:
[∆ti,m
>
i ]
> ∼ N (µi−1, diag(σi−1)),
[µi,σ
>
i ]
> = ψ1(hi),
hi = ψ2(hi−1, zi), i = 1, . . . , NT ,
h0 = 0,
where the hidden state hi ∈ Rp encodes the sequence of
past events {z1, . . . , zi−1}, zi ∈ X ; N (µ,Σ) stands for the
multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean µ ∈ Rd+1 and
covariance matrix Σ ∈ R(d+1)×(d+1); here we only consider
variance terms and thus the covariance matrix is diagonal with
diagonal entries specified by a vector σi, and diag(x) means to
convert the vector x to a diagonal matrix. Note that the process
stops running until ti < T and ti + ∆ti+1 ≥ T . Functions
ψ1 : Rp → R(d+1)2+d+1 and ψ2 : Rp+d+1 → Rp can be any
nonlinear mappings, and here we use neural networks – an
adjusted LSTM cell and a fully-connected neural networks.
The set of all trainable parameters in ψ1, ψ2 are denoted by
ϕ ∈ G.
There are two major differences our model from the vanilla
version of RNNs: (1) the outputs are sampled from hidden
states rather than obtained by deterministic transformations
(as in the vanilla version); randomly sampling will allow the
learner to explore the events’ space; (2) the sampled time point
will be fed back to the RNN.
We learns the parameters of the adversarial detector in
an off-line fashion, by performing alternating minimization
between optimizing the generator Gz(ϕ) and optimizing the
anomaly discriminator `(θ), using stochastic gradient descent
(which better suits training on large datasets). Let M0 be
the number of iterations, and M1 be the number of steps to
apply to the discriminator. Let n′, n′′ < n be the number of
generated adversarial sequences and the number of training
8Algorithm 2: Adversarial learning algorithm
input: dataset X = {xi}i=1,...,n;
initialization: model parameters θ, ϕ;
for 1, . . . ,M0 do
(1) Randomly draw n′′ training sequences from X
denoted as X̂ = {xl ∈ X}l=1,...,n′′ ⊆ X;
(2) Generate n′ adversarial sequences from Gz(z;ϕ)
denoted as Ẑ = {zl}l=1,...,n′ ;
(3) Generate D Fourier features from Gζ(ζ; θ)
denoted as Ω̂ = {ωk}k=1,...,D;
Update ϕ by descending gradient given X̂, Ẑ, Ω̂:
∇ϕ 1
n′′
n′′∑
l=1
`(xl; θ)− 1
n′
n′∑
l=1
`(zl; θ);
for 1, . . . ,M1 do
Redo steps (1), (2), (3) to obtain new X̂, Ẑ, Ω̂;
Update θ by ascending gradient given X̂, Ẑ, Ω̂:
∇θ 1
n′′
n′′∑
l=1
`(xl; θ)− 1
n′
n′∑
l=1
`(zl; θ);
end
end
sequences in a mini-batch, respectively. The learning process
is summarized in Algorithm 2.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We perform comprehensive numerical studies to compare
the performance of the proposed adversarial anomaly detector
with the state-of-the-art. Consider two synthetic and one real
data sets (1) singleton synthetic data consists of 1,000
anomalous sequences with an average length of 32. Each se-
quence is simulated by a Hawkes process with an exponential
kernel specified in (4), where β = 3 and µ = 10, α = 1; (2)
composite synthetic data consists of 1,000 mixed anoma-
lous sequences with an average length of 29. Every 200
of the sequences are simulated by five Hawkes processes
with different exponential kernels, where µ = 10, α = 1,
and β = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, respectively; and a real dataset (3)
Macy’s fraudulent credit transaction data consists of 1,121
fraudulent credit transaction sequences with an average length
of 21. Each anomalous transaction in a sequence includes
the occurrence location, time, and corresponding transaction
amount in the dollar. In the experiments, we under-sample the
Fourier features, where D = 20, to improve training efficiency.
In addition, we adopt the batch size of n′ = n′′ = 32 and the
model gets its convergence around M0 = 1, 000 iterations with
M1 = 5.
We compare our method (referred to as AIL) with the three
state-of-the-art approaches: one-class support vector machines
[40] (One-class SVM), the cumulative sum of features ex-
tracted by principal component analysis [41] (PCA+CUMCUM),
local outlier factor [42] (LOF); and a recent study on lever-
aging IRL framework to attack sequential anomaly detection
[15] (IRL-AD).
We adopt standard performance metrics, including preci-
sion, recall, and F1 score, all of which have been widely
used in the information retrieval literature [43]. This choice
is because anomaly detection can be viewed as a binary
classification problem, where the detector identifies if an
unknown sequence is an anomaly. The F1 score combines
the precision and recall. Define the set of all true anomalous
sequences as U , the set of positive sequences detected by the
optimal detector as V . Then precision P and recall R are
defined by:
P = |U ∩ V |/|V |, R = |U ∩ V |/|U |,
where | · | is the number of elements in the set. The F1 score
is defined as F1 = 2PR/(P + R) and the higher F1 score
the better. Since positive and negative samples in real data are
highly unbalanced, we do not use the ROC curve (true positive
rate versus false-positive rate) in our setting.
Our evaluation procedure is described as follows. We mix
the above data sets, respectively, with 5,000 random “normal”
sequences simulated by multiple Poisson processes. For each
method on each data set, we perform the online detection
procedure at every time step (a new event occurs) for all mixed
sequences. The precision, recall, and F1 score will be recorded
accordingly. The method with higher precision, recall, and F1
score at an earlier time step is more favorable.
First, we summarize the performance of our method on
three data sets in Fig. 10 and confirm that the proposed time-
varying threshold can optimally separate the anomalies from
normal sequences. To be specific, the fourth column in Fig. 10
shows the average log-likelihood (detection statistics) and its
corresponding 1σ region for both anomalous sequences and
normal sequences. As we can see, the anomalous sequences
attain a higher average log-likelihood than the normal se-
quences for all three data sets. Their log-likelihoods fall into
different value ranges with rare overlap. Additionally, the time-
varying threshold indicated by blue dash lines lies between
the value ranges of anomalous and normal sequences, which
produces a nice separation of these two types of sequences at
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Fig. 9: Performance of our method (AIL) and other four
baselines on three data sets. The marks show the average F1
score tested on testing sequences when decisions are made
with observing part of the sequences.
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Fig. 10: Performance of our method (AIL) on three data sets. First three columns correspond to precision, recall, and F1 score
of our method for each data set. The blue lines in the third column indicate our time-varying thresholds. The fourth column
shows the step-wise detection statistics for both anomalous and normal sequences.
any given time. The first three columns in Fig. 10 present more
compelling evidence that the time-varying threshold is near-
optimal. Colored cells of these heat-maps are calculated with
different constant thresholds η at each step i by performing
cross-validation. The brightest regions indicate the “ground
truth” of the optimal choices of the threshold. As shown in
the third column, the time-varying thresholds (blue dash line)
are very close to the optimal choices found by cross-validation.
Then we also compare the step-wise F1 scores with the
other four baselines in Fig. 9. The results show that (1) from
an overall standpoint, our method outperforms other baselines
with significantly higher F1 scores and (2) our method allows
for easier and faster detection of anomalous sequences (before
ten events being observed in our experiments), which is
critically important in sequential scenarios for most of the
applications.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel unsupervised anomaly detection
framework on sequential data based on adversarial learning. A
robust detector can be found by solving a minimax problem,
and the optimal generator also helps in defining the time-
varying threshold for making decisions in an online fashion.
We model the sequential event data using a marked point
process model with a neural Fourier kernel. Using both
synthetic and real data, we demonstrated that our proposed
approach outperforms other state-of-the-art. We believe the
proposed framework is a natural way to tackle the one-
class anomaly detection problem leveraging the advances of
adversarial learning. This new formulation may provide a
first step towards bridging imitation learning and sequential
anomaly detection.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVING CONDITIONAL INTENSITY OF MTPPS
The conditional intensity function is defined by:
λ(t,m|Ht) = f(t,m|Ht)
1− F (t,m|Ht)
which can be interpreted heuristically as the following: con-
sider a small enough interval around t addressed as dt, and a
ball B(m, dm) with radius dm, then
λ(t,m|Ht)dtdm = f(t,m|Ht)dtdm
1− F (t,m|Ht) .
Let the last event before time t be xn := (tn,mn) and denote
Ω = [t, t+dt]×B(m, dm). The above equation can be written
as
P(xn+1 ∈ Ω|Ht)
P(tn+1 /∈ (tn, t)|Ht)
=
P(xn+1 ∈ Ω, tn+1 /∈ (tn, t)|Ht)
P(tn+1 /∈ (tn, t)|Ht)
= P(xn+1 ∈ Ω|tn+1 /∈ (tn, t),Ht)
= P(xn+1 ∈ Ω|Ht)
= E[N(Ω)|Ht].
This shows the definition we present in main section III-A is
equivalent.
APPENDIX B
DERIVING LOG-LIKELIHOOD OF MTPPS
Assume there is a sequence with n events. Its likelihood
function is defined as:
L = f(t1, . . . , tn;m1, . . . ,mn)
= f(t1,m1|Ht2)× · · · × f∗(tn,mn|Htn+1)
=
n∏
i=1
f(ti,mi|Hti+1)
Note from the definition of conditional intensity function, we
get:
λ(t,m|Ht) = f(t,m|Ht)
1− F (t,m|Ht)
=
∂2
∂t∂m
F (t,m|Ht)
1− F (t,m|Ht)
= − ∂
2
∂t∂m
log(1− F (t,m|Ht)).
Integrating both side from tn to T (since λ(t,m|Ht) depends
on history events, so its support is [tn, T )) where tn is the last
event before T . Integrate over all M, we can get:∫ T
tn
∫
m∈M
λ(t′,m′|Ht′)dt′dm′ − log
(
1− F (t,m|Ht)
)
,
obviously, using basic calculus we could find:
f(t,m|Ht) = λ(t,m|Ht)·
exp
(
−
∫ T
tn
∫
M
λ(t′,m′|Ht′)dt′dm′
)
.
Plugging in the above formula into the definition of likelihood
function, we have:
L =
n∏
i=1
(
λ(ti,mi|Ht)
)
·
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
∫
M
λ(t′,m′|Ht′)dt′dm′
)
,
(13)
and the log-likelihood function of marked spatio-temporal
point process can be the written as :
` =
n∑
i=1
log λ(ti,mi|Ht)−
∫ T
0
∫
m∈M
λ(t,m|Ht)dtdm.
(14)
APPENDIX C
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 1
For the notational simplicity, we denote Wx as x. First,
since both K and pω are real-valued, it suffices to consider
only the real portion of eix when invoking Theorem 1. Thus,
using Re[eix] = Re[cos(x) + i sin(x)] = cos(x), we have
K(x, x′) = Re[K(x, x′)] =
∫
Ω
pω(ω) cos(ω
>(x− x′))dω.
Next, we have∫
Ω
pω(ω) cos
(
ω>(x− x′)) dω
(i)
=
∫
Ω
pω(ω) cos
(
ω>(x− x′)) dω+∫
Ω
∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
pω(ω) cos
(
ω>(x+ x′) + 2u
)
dudω
=
∫
Ω
∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
pω(ω)
[
cos
(
ω>(x− x′))+
cos
(
ω>(x+ x′) + 2u
) ]
dudω
=
∫
Ω
∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
pω(ω)
[
2 cos(ω>x+ u) · cos(ω>x′ + u)] dudω
=
∫
Ω
pω(ω)
∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
[√
2 cos(ω>x+ u)·
√
2 cos(ω>x′ + u)
]
dudω
= E [φω(x) · φω(x′)] .
where φω(x) :=
√
2 cos(ω>x+u), ω is sampled from pω , and
u is uniformly sampled from [0, 2pi]. The equation (i) holds
since the second term equals to 0 as shown below:∫
Ω
∫ 2pi
0
pω(ω) cos
(
ω>(x+ x′) + 2u
)
dudω
=
∫
Ω
pω(ω)
∫ 2pi
0
cos
(
ω>(x+ x′) + 2u
)
dudω
=
∫
Ω
pω(ω) · 0 · dω
= 0.
Therefore, we can obtain the result in Proposition 1.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 2
Similar to the proof in Appendix C, we denote Wx as x ∈
X for the notational simplicity. Recall that we denote R as the
radius of the Euclidean ball containing X in Section III-B. In
the following, we first present two useful lemmas.
Lemma 1. Assume X ⊂ Rd is compact. Let R denote the
radius of the Euclidean ball containing X , then for the kernel-
induced feature mapping Φ defined in (9), the following holds
for any 0 < r ≤ 2R and  > 0:
P
{
sup
x,x′∈X
∣∣Φ(x)>Φ(x′)−K(x, x′)∣∣ ≥ }
≤ 2N (2R, r) exp
{
−D
2
8
}
+
4rσp

.
where σ2p = Eω∼pω [ω>ω] < ∞ is the second moment of the
Fourier features, and N (R, r) denotes the minimal number of
balls of radius r needed to cover a ball of radius R.
Proof of Lemma 1. Now, define ∆ = {δ : δ = x−x′, , x, x′ ∈
X} and note that ∆ is contained in a ball of radius at most 2R.
∆ is a closed set since X is closed and thus ∆ is a compact
set. Define B = N (2R, r) the number of balls of radius r
needed to cover ∆ and let δj , for j ∈ [B] denote the center of
the covering balls. Thus, for any δ ∈ ∆ there exists a j such
that δ = δj + r′ where |r′| < r.
Next, we define S(δ) = Φ(x)>Φ(x>) − ν(x, x′), where
δ = x − x′. Since S is continuously differentiable over the
compact set ∆, it is L-Lipschitz with L = supδ∈∆ ||∇S(δ)||.
Note that if we assume L < 2r and for all j ∈ [B] we have|S(δj)| < 2 , then the following inequality holds for all δ =
δj + r
′ ∈ ∆:
|S(δ)| = |S(δj+r′)| ≤ L|δj−(δj+r′)|+|S(δj)| ≤ rL+ 
2
< .
(15)
The remainder of this proof bounds the probability of the
events L > /(2r) and |S(δj)| ≥ /2. Note that all following
probabilities and expectations are with respect to the random
variables ω1, . . . , ωD.
To bound the probability of the first event, we use Proposi-
tion 1 and the linearity of expectation, which implies the key
fact E[∇(Φ(x)>Φ(x′))] = ∇ν(x, x>). We proceed with the
following series of inequalities:
E
[
L2
]
= E
[
sup
δ∈∆
||∇S(δ)||2
]
= E
[
sup
x,x′∈X
||∇(Φ(x)>Φ(x′))−∇ν(x, x′)||2
]
(i)
≤ 2E
[
sup
x,x′∈X
||∇(Φ(x)>Φ(x′))||2
]
+
2 sup
x,x′∈X
||∇ν(x, x′)||2
= 2E
[
sup
x,x′∈X
||∇(Φ(x)>Φ(x′))||2
]
+
2 sup
x,x′∈X
||E [∇(Φ(x)>Φ(x′))] ||2
(ii)
≤ 4E
[
sup
x,x′∈X
||∇(Φ(x)>Φ(x′))||2
]
,
where the first inequality (i) holds due to the the inequality
||a + b||2 ≤ 2||a||2 + 2||b||2 (which follows from Jensens
inequality) and the subadditivity of the supremum function.
The second inequality (ii) also holds by Jensens inequality
(applied twice) and again the subadditivity of supremum
function. Furthermore, using a sum-difference trigonometric
identity and computing the gradient with respect to δ = x−x′,
yield the following for any x, x′ ∈ X :
∇(Φ(x)>Φ(x′)) = ∇
(
1
D
D∑
k=1
cos(ω>k (x− x′))
)
=
1
D
D∑
k=1
ωk sin(ω
>
k (x− x′)).
Combining the two previous results gives
E[L2] ≤ 4E
[
sup
x,x′∈X
|| 1
D
D∑
k=1
ωk sin(ω
>
k (x− x′))||2
]
≤ 4 E
ω1,...,ωD
( 1
D
D∑
k=1
||ωk||
)2
≤ 4 E
ω1,...,ωD
[
1
D
D∑
k=1
||ωk||2
]
= 4E
ω
[||ω||2] = 4σ2p,
which follows from the triangle inequality, | sin(·)| ≤ 1,
Jensens inequality and the fact that the ωks are drawn i.i.d.
derive the final expression. Thus, we can bound the probability
of the first event via Markovs inequality:
P
[
L ≥ 
2r
]
≤
(
4rσp

)2
. (16)
To bound the probability of the second event, note that, by
definition, S(δ) is a sum of D i.i.d. variables, each bounded
in absolute value by 2D (since, for all x and x
′, we have
|ν(x, x′)| ≤ 1 and |Φ(x)>Φ(x′)| ≤ 1), and E[S(δ)] = 0.
Thus, by Hoeffdings inequality and the union bound, we can
write
P
[
∃j ∈ [B] : |S(δj)| ≥ 
2
]
≤
B∑
j=1
P
[
|S(δj)| ≥ 
2
]
≤ 2B exp
(
−D
2
8
)
.
(17)
Finally, combining (15), (16), (17), and the definition of B we
have the result in Proposition 2, i.e.,
P
[
sup
δ∈∆
|S(δj)| ≥ 
]
≤ 2N (2R, r) exp
{
−D
2
8
}
+
(
4rσp

)2
,
As we can see now, a key factor in the bound of the
proposition is the covering number N(2R, r), which strongly
depends on the dimension of the space N . In the following
proof, we make this dependency explicit for one especially
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simple case, although similar arguments hold for more general
scenarios as well.
Lemma 2. Let X ⊂ Rd be a compact and let R denote
the radius of the smallest enclosing ball. Then, the following
inequality holds:
N (R, r) ≤
(
3R
r
)d
.
Proof of Lemma 2. By using the volume of balls in Rd, we
already see that Rd/(r/3)d = (3R/r)d is a trivial upper bound
on the number of balls of radius r/3 that can be packed into a
ball of radius R without intersecting. Now, consider a maximal
packing of at most (3R/r)d balls of radius r/3 into the ball
of radius R. Every point in the ball of radius R is at distance
at most r from the center of at least one of the packing balls.
If this were not true, we would be able to fit another ball into
the packing, thereby contradicting the assumption that it is a
maximal packing. Thus, if we grow the radius of the at most
(3R/r)d balls to r, they will then provide a (not necessarily
minimal) cover of the ball of radius R.
Finally, by combining the two previous lemmas, we can
present an explicit finite sample approximation bound. We
use lemma 1 in conjunction with lemma 2 with the following
choice of r:
r =
2(6R)d exp(−D28 )(
4σp

)2

2
d+2
,
which results in the following expression
P
[
sup
δ∈∆
|S(δ)| ≥ 
]
≤ 4
(
24Rσp

) 2d
d+2
exp
(
− D
2
4(d+ 2)
)
.
Since 32Rσp/ ≥ 1, the exponent 2d/(d+ 2) can be replaced
by 2, which completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 3
To calculate the integral (the second term of the log-
likelihood function defined in (5)), we first need consider the
time and the mark of events separately, i.e., x = [t,m]>.
Denote i as the imaginary unit. Hence the integral can be
written as∫ T
0
∫
M
µ+ ∑
tj<t
K˜([t,m]>, [tj ,mj ]>)
 dmdt
=
∫ T
0
∫
M
µ+ ∑
tj<t
1
D
D∑
k=1
eiω
>
k W ([t,m]
>−[tj ,mj ]>)
 dmdt1
= µT |M|+ 1
D
D∑
k=1
∫ T
0
∫
M
∑
tj<t
eiω
>
k W ([t,m]
>−[tj ,mj ]>)dmdt
=
1
D
D∑
k=1
NT∑
i=0
∫ ti+1
ti
∫
M
∑
tj<t
eiω
>
k W ([t,m]
>−[tj ,mj ]>)dmdt
+ µT |M|
=
1
D
D∑
k=1
NT∑
i=0
∑
tj<ti
∫ ti+1
ti
∫
M
eiω
>
k W ([t,m]
>−[tj ,mj ]>)dmdt
+ µT |M| (18)
Then the remainder of the proof calculates the integral∫ ti+1
ti
∫
M e
iω>k W ([t,m]
>−[tj ,mj ]>)dmdt. First, let the weight
matrix W = [w0|w1| . . . |wd] be split into d+1 column vectors,
where w0 ∈ Rr×1, w` ∈ Rr×1, ` = 1, . . . , d correspond to the
linear mappings for the time and mark subspace, respectively.
Denote the matrix formed by first ` column vectors of matrix
W as W1:` := [w1| . . . |w`]. Denote the `-th dimension of M
as M` ∈ R, ` = 1, . . . , d. Assume each dimension of the
mark space M`, ` = 1, . . . , d is normalized to range [a, b].
Denote the sub-space of M with the first ` dimensions as
M1:` := M1×, . . . ,×M`, ` = 1, . . . , d. Denote the mark
vector with first ` elements as m1:` = [m1, . . . ,m`]. Then the
integral can be written as∫ ti+1
ti
∫
M
eiω
>
k W ([t,m]
>−[tj ,mj ]>)dmdt
= e−iω
>
k W [tj ,mj ]
>
∫ ti+1
ti
∫
M
eiω
>
k W [t,m]
>
dmdt
= e−iω
>
k W [tj ,mj ]
>
∫ ti+1
ti
eiω
>
k w0tdt
∫
M
eiω
>
k W1:dm
>
dm.
(19)
To avoid notational overload, let fk,`(m) denote eiω
>
k w`m` ,
and Fk,`(m) denote eiω
>
k W1:`m
>
1:` . Note that∫ b
a
fk,`(m)dm` =
eiω
>
k w`b − eiω>k w`a
iω>k w`
,
and Fk,`(m) = fk,`(m)Fk,`−1(m). Then
∫
M e
iω>k W1:dm
>
dm
can be written as∫
M
eiω
>
k W1:dm
>
dm
=
∫
M
Fk,d(m)dm
=
∫
M1:d−1
Fk,d−1(m)dm1:d−1
∫ b
a
fk,d(m)dmd
=
d∏
`=1
(∫ b
a
fk,`(m)dm`
)
=
d∏
`=1
(
eiω
>
k w`b − eiω>k w`a
iω>k w`
)
. (20)
Substitute (20) into (19), we have
e−iω
>
k W [tj ,mj ]
>
∫ ti+1
ti
eiω
>
k w0tdt
∫
M
eiω
>
k W1:dm
>
dm
= e−iω
>
k W [tj ,mj ]
>
(
eiω
>
k w0ti+1 − eiω>k w0ti
iω>k w0
)
d∏
`=1
(
eiω
>
k w`b − eiω>k w`a
iω>k w`
)
. (21)
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Due to the fact that, for any b > a where a, b ∈ R,
eiω
>
k w`b − eiω>k w`a
iω>k w`
=
eω
>
k w`
ω>k w`
· e
ib − eia
i
=
eω
>
k w`
ω>k w`
· ei b+a2 · e
i b−a2 − ei a−b2
i
(i)
=
2eω
>
k w`
ω>k w`
(
cos
(
b+ a
2
)
+ i sin
(
b+ a
2
))
sin
(
b− a
2
)
(ii)
=
2eω
>
k w`
ω>k w`
cos
(
b+ a
2
)
sin
(
b− a
2
)
.
The equality (i) holds because of Euler’s formula. The equality
(ii) holds, since both K and pω are real-valued, it suffices
to consider only the real portion. Let xj denote [tj ,mj ]>
and substitute exp{−iω>k W [tj ,mj ]>} with cos(−ω>k Wxj).
Thus, the integral (19) can be written as
cos
(−ω>k Wxj) cos( ti+1 + ti2
)
sin
(
ti+1 − ti
2
)
cosd
(
b+ a
2
)
sind
(
b− a
2
) d+1∏
`=1
2eω
>
k w`
ω>k w`
.
(22)
Finally, combining previous results in (18), (19), and (22) gives
the result in Proposition 3, i.e.,∫
X
λ(x|Ht; θ0)dx = µT (b− a)d + 1
D
D∑
k=1
NT∑
i=0
∑
tj<ti
cos
(−ω>k Wxj) cos( ti+1 + ti2
)
sin
(
ti+1 − ti
2
)
cosd
(
b+ a
2
)
sind
(
b− a
2
) d+1∏
`=1
2eω
>
k w`
ω>k w`
.
